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STRAIGHT, NO CHASER: THE SEASON IN REVIEW

This week's article shares 10 topics from the 2023 season that will carry over to 2024 and beyond. Time to explore the players, schemes, and fantasy ideas that this season taught us or served as further validation.

The

1. The White Whale of the NFL: Evaluating Quarterbacks

Collectively, we have no clue how to evaluate NFL quarterbacks. Individual exceptions aside, this includes the NFL, the media, former quarterbacks and GMs in the media, fantasy football analysts, and fans.

There's no shame here; NFL quarterbacking is the most difficult job in sports. It's also the most difficult job to evaluate because there are so many variables that contribute to success and failure.

Many of these variables are dynamic, meaning they can improve or regress due to external and internal factors — repeated punishment due to poor pass protection, unreliable route runners, lockerroom politics, teams using benching as a tool of punishment instead of a method of education, and slacking off on the routine work to keep techniques sharp.

It's no surprise that hitting on a first-round quarterback in the NFL Draft is slightly better than a coin flip, especially when you consider the factors mentioned above. Now, throw in the league and the public's collective ignorance of how vital mental and physical processing speed is to the position — at least until recently.

Even so, the means used to understand and evaluate a quarterback's processing is still in its infancy. Ask C.J. Stroud, who performed poorly on a pair of tests intended to provide an off-field measurement of a passer's processing capabilities on the field.

I saw a lot of people on social media trying to deliver revisionist history about Anthony Richardson's abilities after seeing the promise he showed with the Colts. They either couldn't see or prioritize what was most important about Richardson's performances at Florida.

It's the same mindset I saw last week when former NFL player Darius Butler shared his analysis of Lamar Jackson, claiming the Ravens quarterback has improved as a pocket manager when that has been one of Jackson's great strengths since he was at Louisville.

I'm not the only scout who saw that back then either. This week, I had someone joke that this type of analysis on Jackson was an attempt to walk back the Good Old Boy Network's view that Jackson was a wide receiver.

This isn't to say Stroud or Richardson have proven beyond a shadow of a doubt that they are long-term franchise-caliber passers, either. We're often just as bad at projecting long-term success after quarterbacks become NFL starters.

Quarterbacks typically need 18-30 games to show whether they're capable of leading a franchise long-term. Typically, opposing defenses don't gameplan specifically for first-time starters at the position, leading to temporarily inflated production.

Marcus Mariota and Will Levis both had four-touchdown debuts as NFL passers. Levis's first game was the sixth-best fantasy performance of the week at the position. Since then, Levis has been QB22 with a trajectory that's hovered outside fantasy starter range since his first few games:

• From Weeks 8-10, Levis was QB14 in fantasy leagues.
• From Weeks 10-12, Levis has been QB24.
• From Weeks 12-15, Levis has been QB18.

Perhaps Levis becomes a good NFL quarterback, but his production trajectory epitomizes how defenses don't adjust until they've had at least a few games of the player's film to evaluate. Once they do, they begin game planning against the passer with specific tweaks — adding a little more each week.

Complicating matters is the quality of the scheme, the coaches, and the surrounding talent. Trevor Lawrence rightfully earned a mulligan after Urban Meyer inflicted his crimes against football on the Jaguars during Lawrence's rookie season. This seemed justifiable to most after Lawrence showed improvement last year, but by midseason of this year, folks were jumping off the bandwagon and citing the data on Lawrence as THE indicator he had regressed in Year Three.

A sensible thought on the surface, but perhaps the biggest problem with quarterback evaluation is the massive amount of superficial information that's taken as gospel without additional context.

After examining Lawrence's film and data after Week 10, I found that at least 7 of Lawrence's 13 turnovers in 2023 weren't plays that would fit the reckless label foisted on his game despite the NFL scoring them as Lawrence's responsibility. When factoring out these turnovers — and I was even being generous to the NFL's scoring of some of these plays against Lawrence — it was clear that the dour projections and concern about his development trajectory were overstated.

Lawrence was fantasy football's QB18 after 10 weeks. Since Week 11, Lawrence has been QB1. He must have played a soft schedule during this span, right? Here's the schedule since Week 11 with the unit's rank against fantasy quarterbacks for the year. The higher the number, the stingier the unit. I also placed Lawrence's fantasy rankings for each week in bold:

• Tennessee: 21st. QB1
• Houston: 12th. QB7
• Cincinnati: 7th. QB5
• Cleveland: 29th. QB15.
• Baltimore: 30th. QB12.

Lawrence has delivered starter production against all but one of the three stingiest fantasy units to quarterbacks in football, and even then, he was still in a startable range.

Quarterback data has value when considered in a proper context. As mentioned in this column last year (see point No.5), the problem is the ease of leaning on data that drives clicks but doesn't provide an accurate picture of the player.

Whether we're evaluating quarterback performance in college and projecting to the NFL or evaluating NFL play and projecting it long-term, we collectively haven't figured out how to consistently prioritize and contextualize the value of a player's skills, scheme, surrounding talent, draft capital, and performance data to predict success or failure.

In addition to the only recent emphasis on better contextualizing processing speed, our lack of skill with prioritization and contextualization of the other factors just mentioned above leads us to contradict ourselves when a player doesn't follow the NFL-Media-Fantasy Matrix about the position.

Brock Purdy is a great example.

2. Brock Purdy Is Legit and We Contradict Ourselves Over Him

Jimmy Garoppolo played six seasons in San Francisco and has two top-16 finishes as the No.14 option in 2019 and the No.16 option in 2021. His Yards per Attempt (YPA) and completion percentages have been strong, but Purdy's 9.88 YPA is more than a yard better than anything Garoppolo averaged. And he's doing it with a better completion percentage and touchdown-to-interception ratio.

He's also the No.3 quarterback in fantasy in the two-high era of defenses that have shut down the vertical passing game for the past two seasons relative to what we have been seeing in the NFL for the past 5-7 years.

Purdy makes some risky-ill-advised throws in the style of a young Matthew Stafford, Brett Favre, or Kirk Cousins but with an arm that rivals Cousins and will never be mistaken in the same category as the first two. Yet, he only has seven interceptions. You don't get away with that many bad throws and only have 11 career interceptions in 23 games.

If you study Purdy's placement and processing in the middle of the field against tight windows of coverage, you will see superior cognitive and throwing skills that would have many of you drooling over any other quarterback with better draft capital if they did what he has this season.

The bias of draft capital is a big source of the problem for the NFL, the media, and the public. The earlier the pick, the more common it is for teams to give that player more reps, starts, and chances to improve because of the significant financial investment and fear of looking wrong if they give up too soon.

With late picks and UDFAs, organizations give fewer reps, starts, and chances to improve. They'll often dismiss the potential of a late pick on far fewer reps for similar or lesser mistakes than the patience they'll afford an early-round pick.

Most of the time, organizations don't even give a late pick a chance to engage in equal competition with early-round picks or starters without permission from the front office, and it usually happens only when the front office is ready to save money on a veteran's contract or the team has endured bad PR on a disappointing early-round pick.

Purdy, like Tom Brady, was a happy accident who was needed later in the season as a desperation starter and performed above team expectations. Like Brady, the league and the public regarded Purdy as a fluke who was playing above his pay grade on a strong team, and the clock would strike midnight sooner than later.

There's no doubt that Purdy has a loaded roster. Digging deeper, let's return to the fact that opposing defenses have shut down the deep passing game during the past two seasons and Purdy, with a below-average arm for a starter, is still earning a league-leading (by a missive margin) 9.88 yards per attempt without a pure field-stretcher of a deep threat who can beat man coverage like Tyreek Hill or Randy Moss.

I love Brandon Aiyuk, but he's not in the vein athlete I'm talking about here. The most explosive option is Deebo Samuel, who is only a skilled route runner against zone coverage and has legitimate holes in his game against man-to-man.

Yes, 9.88 yards per attempt in a league that has put the governor on deep throws and doing it without a man-to-man speed demon. Let that sink in a little deeper.

Like Brady, Purdy is critiqued as a system quarterback who benefits from his offense. I've got news for you: Every quarterback is a system quarterback to some degree and to the degree they aren't, we give too much value to off-structure play.

We also confuse mobility and certain forms of off-structure creativity with productivity potential independent of the system and players who mostly stay in the pocket as system-dependent. It's exciting.

That off-structure game can sometimes be the difference in a ball game. Yet, there are more opportunities to make a difference in a game with efficient decisions from the pocket under pressure.

This requires a split-second understanding of the defense and game situation, confident timing, and precise placement. This quartet of skills is the foundation of good processing at the quarterback position.

This is what separated Tom Brady and Peyton Manning from the rest of the league. This is why Lamar Jackson isn't a wide receiver. This is why C.J. Stroud is having early success.

Few have done this better than Purdy this year. Instead of recognizing the value of the throws that few quarterbacks make as consistently Purdy, which are most valuable to NFL quarterbacking, we saw a collective criticism of Purdy during a stretch of 3-4 games where he made bad decisions that most quarterbacks made consistently during the first 2-3 years of their career.

Again, the public has been giving more weight to Purdy's bad decisions most young starters commit early in their career and less weight to Purdy's throws that top veterans with franchise-caliber careers deliver. This was evident after the sweeping criticism leveled at him after the Bengals' game.

Yes, it was a disappointing performance, but when examining the game with a broader scope, Purdy made more plays that were common for top-end starters.

Purdy has been statistically better than most quarterbacks in the league and more successful downfield despite the era we're in with defenses and a lack of a game-changing deep threat. We still attribute Purdy's success to his great surrounding talent, just as we did with Brady early in his career.

Purdy wouldn't be any better than Mac Jones if he were in New England.

With that offensive line, receiving corps, and a defensive coordinator as your rookie-year offensive coordinator, Justin Herbert, Lamar Jackson, C.J. Stroud, Patrick Mahomes II, and every other quarterback in the NFL wouldn't be nearly as good as they were if beginning their careers in Foxboro in the same situation as Jones.

We diminish Purdy (and Brady) for having a strong team, but many of us (correctly) excused Lawrence, Dak Prescott, and Lamar Jackson for their lack of healthy weapons and offensive line during down seasons.

You can't have both. But our bias in favor of top athletes who deliver off-structure and often have early-round draft capital has become pervasive to the point that we are simply following the popular football culture's algorithms with the broken QB Development Matrix...

• Early-round draft capital.
• Big arm
• Mobility
• Size
• Off-structure acumen

We only allow these players to benefit from scheme fit and surrounding talent without lobbing backhanded compliments or criticism. We only gave praise to Brady years after he had already proved the biases wrong. Purdy will have to continue doing the same because if we collectively accept Purdy's performance in the proper context, we'd have to admit we know little about what makes a good quarterback in the NFL.

3. Jordan Love's Path is the One Most Teams Should take with QB Prospects

Before we get to Love, let's begin with Bryce Young. It will also tie together quickly, promise. Young's struggles are illustrative of the detriments of the biases of draft capital from the opposite end of Brock Purdy on the spectrum.

NFL owners and GMs push for early first-round picks to start immediately. The expectation is that if they are good enough to command top dollar among draft picks, then they are good enough to play now, learn on the fly, and fill seats in the home stadium.

Some quarterbacks respond well to starting immediately. Some struggle in Year One, survive the onslaught, and make dramatic improvements in Year Two. Almost half of the first-round quarterbacks can't handle the early acclimation period, and by Year Three, they have lost confidence in their ability to play the game at a high level.

Carolina gave Young the starting job immediately, likely thanks to the demanding and impatient David Tepper, who fired Frank Reich midway through Reich's first season with a team that needed more talent along the offensive line and receiving corps. Perhaps there are valid reasons for Reich getting the ax, but there better be egregious issues for it to happen this soon.

Then again, Tepper has overseen two other midseason firings during his first six as the team's owner who hired all three head coaches. Maybe he should fire himself from hiring coaches, but we know that's not going to happen.

While Reich certainly had some strategic errors with managing games this year, the real question concerning Young, the coaching staff, and the organizational leadership is whether Reich was forced to start Young immediately. Many owners apply that pressure with early-round quarterbacks.

I'm betting this is the case because most veteran coaches, especially former NFL quarterbacks with coaching experience like Reich, prefer their young passers to have an acclimation period. I would think Reich would feel this way, especially with Andy Dalton on the roster.

Then there's the matter of Dalton's 361-yard, 2-touchdown, 0-interception performance against Seattle in Week 3 after watching Young and the rest of the offense struggle for the first two weeks. It should have been an easy call to go with Dalton for several weeks, give Young a chance to sit and watch, and frame this experience to the rookie as a learning opportunity rather than a message along the lines of, "You suck, and we're giving up early."

A lot of great quarterbacks sat early on including Brett Favre, Tom Brady, Joe Montana, Steve McNair, Steve Young, and Patrick Mahomes II. All of them have been league MVPs.

Many others, including Montana, Young, and McNair, earned intermittent playing time. They played in parts of games or started several games but also saw the bench as a pre-planned event or when they struggled. Drew Brees earned that treatment in San Diego and credited it for making him the quarterback he became in New Orleans.

Jordan Love got intermittent playing time in relief of Aaron Rodgers during his first three years in the league, playing 10 games with 1 start. Love was fortunate that a patient team with foresight selected him in the first round because, by the standards of the Teppers of the NFL world, Love would have been expected to start immediately. If that was the expectation for a first-round pick, Love wasn't remotely worth that draft capital.

However, if we're projecting potential along a longer developmental timeline, Love's athletic ability and throwing prowess made him an easy first-rounder. Allowing him to sit three years behind a future Hall of Famer, develop his footwork, learn how to work in the NFL, acclimate to adult life in a new town and profession, and get enough playing time to get a feel for the speed and complexity of the league was ultimately the best course.

It should be the rule for acclimating a quarterback to the NFL, but it has become the exception. Instead, we're going to default to superficial debates comparing Young and Stroud. I just gave you a list of MVP quarterbacks whose development was closer to Love's, but we're going to suffer through the arguments along the lines of "Yeah, but Stroud managed immediately, so Young just isn't good enough."

If you're in a dynasty league and a team with a respectable track record of success drafts a first-round quarterback with the plan to sit him short-term behind a veteran, odds are likely that's the quarterback you want to draft.

4. KC's Passing Game Is A Bait-and-Switch Con For Picking Fantasy WRs

Yes, Rashee Rice has been a top-15 PPR receiver (WR14) since Week 10, but when we look at the fantasy value of receivers in Andy Reid's offense, it's a near-annual chasing of rainbows for a pot of gold that doesn't exist. We're conning ourselves, and in this respect, Patrick Mahomes II is the bait, and Andy Reid's offense is the switch.

Mahomes has the skills to support more than two starter-level fantasy components in the passing game. The biggest obstacle is Andy Reid and his version of the West Coast Offense.

Like Kyle Shanahan's offense, it demands a lot of the wide receivers. This has been the case since Reid began his NFL head coaching career in Philadelphia.

From 1999-2012, 21 receivers joined Reid's Eagles as their first NFL team via the draft or free agency. Only three of those receivers developed into contributors who earned one season with at least 800 yards. I didn't count James Thrash's totals in 1999 because Reid inherited the receiver.

• Reggie Brown: 816 yards (2006)
• DeSean Jackson: 912 yards (2008), 1156 yards (2009), 1056 yards (2010), and 961 yards (2011)
• Jeremy Maclin: 964 yards (2010), 859 yards (2011), and 857 yards (2012)

The only veteran free agents to exceed that 800-yard total during Reid's tenure in Philadelphia were Terrell Owens' 1,200-yard campaign and Kevin Curtis with 1,110 yards.

Reid coached 14 seasons in Philadelphia and only had 4 seasons worth 1,000-yard receiving totals from 3 players. Our Walrus-mustachioed friend has finished 11 seasons in Kansas City and has 5 seasons worth of 1,000-yard totals from two players: Jason Avant in 2015 and Tyreek Hill during four of his five seasons with the Chiefs.

Add JuJu Smith-Schuster's 933-yard campaign last year, and you're looking at three Chiefs who've delivered seven seasons of at least 800 yards. This is also a smaller total than expected for an excellent offensive coaching mind with an MVP-caliber quarterback in his prime.

This is not a criticism of Reid's offensive prowess; it's simply a portrait of his system. The Chiefs employ a lot of personnel sets with two and three tight ends. Last year, the Chiefs used 13 personnel (1 back and 3 tight ends) in 9.8 percent of its snaps — third-most in the league behind Tennessee (12.5 percent) and Seattle (11.1 percent).

It's a great way to feed its top option, Travis Kelce.

Kansas City employed 11 personnel (three receivers) only 56.3 percent of the time — the sixth-lowest in the league last year. Reid's offense mixes up personnel enough that it doesn't lean as hard on its receiving corps as other teams in terms of snap volume.

Yet, Reid also demands its receivers learn multiple roles so he can move players around and keep opposing defenses off balance. Although the Chiefs have embraced spread concepts, it's still a West Coast Offense — the most complex offense for quarterbacks and receivers to learn.

Combine these factors with a quarterback who excels off-script and has the mind to make adjustments at the highest level and Kansas City isn't an easy place to excel for young receivers. It takes a certain amount of NFL experience to build a rapport with a mind like Mahomes.

Perhaps it's time to curtail expectations that Patrick Mahomes II II, the Chiefs, and Andy Reid's offense are a potential goldmine for fantasy options not named Travis Kelce and, occasionally, a physically (Hill) or conceptually (Smith-Schuster) elite receiver.

For first- and second-year options, developing a good route tree, defeating press coverage, learning the offense, and reading coverage to Mahomes' expectations is enough. Developing off-script rapport is a whole other category of detail.

Rice is promising and potentially one of the exceptions, but most of us spent the preseason considering Skyy Moore and Kadarius Toney in the early rounds.

5. Sam LaPorta and the Future of Rookie TE Production

In Week 12's Roundtable panel on players we warned to pump the breaks on labeling them a bust, Footballguys staffer Sean Settle touted Jameson Williams, noting that the Lions don't have a true No.2 receiver and we should "look for [Williams usage to increase] as Sam Laporta comes back down."

I couldn't agree more that Williams shouldn't be labeled a bust. That said, LaPorta isn't losing his stranglehold in the Lions' passing game pecking order as the No.2 option — at least not this year, and I'm not ready to tacitly agree with Sean that LaPorta isn't the true No.2 receiver in this offense. What could this mean for the future of rookie TE production?

The No.3 PPR TE in fantasy football heading into Week 16, Laporta's 201.2 fantasy points placed him 19th among receivers and tight ends, only 6 points behind No.16 option Travis Kelce, perennial the No.1 or No.2 receiving threat in Kansas City's offense.

It's not only the fact that LaPorta is TE3 as a rookie but also the fact that there's little separation between LaPorta and Kelce. If you consider that the 10-point difference between LaPorta and the TE1, T.J. Hockenson, is less than one catch per game in PPR formats.

LaPorta is at No.3 spot for all-time rookie performances at the position and should have passed Keith Jackson (203.9) on this list on Sunday (I wrote this beforehand). If he has the type of game he had in Week 15, LaPorta could threaten Mike Ditka's (235.6) historic mark Ditka's mark.

While LaPorta has a chance to take down a record I've mentioned for years as one of the least likely to be threatened — at least until Kyle Pitts entered the league two years ago — let's remember Ditka achieved his production with fewer games on the regular season schedule.

Still, Pitts, LaPorta, Evan Engram, Rob Gronkowski, Pat Freiermuth, and Aaron Hernandez all made the top-15 rookie performance list for PPR production during the past 14 years, an indication that the NFL's change to a pass-first league with spread offenses and a preference for receiving tight ends ahead of the difficult-to-find unicorns like Gronkowski and to a more limited extent, Freiermuth.

This league-wide change creates more early opportunities for accomplished receivers at the position.

As I wrote in the 2023 Rookie Scouting Portfolio this spring, this year's class was the deepest and most talented I've studied in 18 years of publication when prioritizing receiving threats at the position.

Three players stood out as options whose skills could translate immediately into strong fantasy production, and the two most likely on my list were Dalton Kincaid and LaPorta.

I spent much of this summer touting Kincaid as that high-end difference maker. Kincaid was TE12 heading into Week 16. Considering that Buffalo hasn't used Kincaid as a vertical or red-zone weapon, and it took them weeks to raise his target share, Kincaid has come pretty close to that high-end projection.

If Kincaid has two strong performances in the final weeks of the season, he has a shot to overtake Hernandez for the final spot on the top-15 list. Hey may not have delivered elite fantasy numbers relative to veteran tight ends this year, but it's approaching rarified air by rookie standards.

LaPorta has been the player whose team has leveraged his talents the best. In my position chapter in the RSP, I described LaPorta as having "legitimate skills that could translate immediately and, if featured early for [his] receiving, could be the most production rookie option." In his actual report, I wrote, "I would not be shocked if he's the first tight end in this class to earn compelling production on Sundays."

You can read my pre-draft scouting report on LaPorta here.

While it would be reasonable to think along the lines that Sean did with Jameson Williams eventually usurping LaPorta as the No.2 option, Detroit's offense does not fit the traditional definitions with personnel. Amon-Ra St. Brown isn't even a traditional primary option.

While a talented possession receiver who can occasionally get open in the vertical game with the help of play-action and other misdirection schemes, he is not a field stretcher on par with the likes of JaMarr Chase, Justin Jefferson, Stefon Diggs, Davante Adams, or A.J. Brown. Detroit sees Williams as a big-play field stretcher with YAC skills who opens the field for other receivers with his speed.

Even so, Detroit wants to run the football and maximize Jared Goff's time in a clean pocket. They know that pocket quarterbacks win big if given time to pick apart a defense. A great way to dictate terms to a defense while maximizing the protection of the passer is aligning with multiple tight ends.

Detroit uses alignments with at least two tight ends on 31.8 percent of its snaps — only Denver, Green Bay, Kansas City, New England, Seattle, and Tennessee use multiple tight ends more often.

The only one of these six teams that has an accomplished receiver on LaPorta's level at the tight end position is Kansas City. Like Kelce, LaPorta fits perfectly in this system. He's just good enough of a blocker to seal the edge on perimeter run plays, he runs timing routes on the perimeter with the precision of a wide receiver, and he's reliable over the middle.

However, the biggest thing people miss about LaPorta when they think of him as a flukish producer is his athletic profile. As I wrote in his pre-draft scouting report, "LaPorta is Evan Engram without the history of flaws as a pass catcher, with five more pounds on his frame, and with almost the same acceleration and short-area quickness. Engram might be 1-2 steps faster, but based on where they win underneath and in the middle of the field, their 40-yard-dash times are the list's important metric in the comparison."

When LaPorta wins in the vertical game, he's usually matched against a linebacker or safety. Even so, let's remember that a lot of teams also graded Engram as a wide receiver prospect.

Although LaPorta catches a lot of passes in the short and intermediate game, that's how the Lions want to operate. They also have success finding LaPorta deep with mismatches against slower defenders.

This is a sure-handed rookie with excellent route skills and agility to make multiple defenders miss in the open field. Say what you want about the speed of Luke Musgrave and the contested-catch skills of Kincaid or Michael Mayer. LaPorta is already on the same page with his quarterback with reading coverage that these other options aren't.

That's one of the most important parts of playing tight end. While you're waiting for Musgrave or Kincaid to become vertical options in their offense that net them a play of 40-60 yards every five weeks, LaPorta is generating these totals — plus 1-2 big plays downfield or in the red zone — on almost a weekly basis.

Unless LaPorta loses his quarterback and offense the way Pitts lost Matt Ryan, expect LaPorta to remain one of the top two receiving options on the Lions this year and next.

As for what this means for rookie tight ends, expect a rise in first-year production that's starter-worthy for fantasy leagues. About 15-20 years ago, this was rare. For the past 15 years, it has been upgraded from rare to uncommon, and uncommon is where I'd expect it to remain for at least another decade.

Remember, the tight end position is physically demanding because it encompasses a wide range of athletic requirements that few body types can incorporate successfully into their games — even for receiver-first/blocker-second types.

6. Favorable Box Counts: Making Magic for Swift, Williams, and Achane

What tips can you give me to help me scout players?

It's a common question over the past 10 years. One of the most practical tips for running backs is to learn about box counts.

The box is the area within five yards of the line of scrimmage on either side of the ball. If the offense has more players in the box than the defense, they have an inherent advantage with the play. If the defense has more players in the box, they have the advantage.

On offense, you should count the running back as one of those players. If the quarterback is a viable runner and the play is designed to give the quarterback an option to keep the ball as a runner, count him as well.

That's the simple explanation. Let's add more nuance.

When you watch a running play, note the direction of the play and how it's blocked. Remember those details and then rewind the play and note how many offensive players and defensive players are in the box to the side of the center where the play's design is intended. If there's a puller or late motion from a blocker to the side of the play design, count that as well.

It's best to learn the basics of run-play designs to get the most context from this exercise, but you'll still learn a lot without it.

Generally, when the box count of the offense versus the defense is even, it's still worth running the play. A +1 personnel advantage for the offense should generate a positive play, even one that moves the chains. A +2 personnel advantage or greater could increase the odds of a big play or breakaway gain. At the very least, it should generate a large hole to the second level of the defense if blocks aren't missed.

This exercise is the basis for my September analysis of DAndre Swift's performance against the Vikings and why I wasn't one of the minions lauding Swift as an elite runner.

It's also why I'm skeptical of Kyren Williams becoming the next Priest Holmes and waiting to see if Devon Achane's running through empty highways at 3 am will continue — or can continue without him breaking down.

Box counts help you see how much a runner is a product of his system versus how much he's a standalone talent who can make his blockers look better than they are.

It doesn't mean you should avoid drafting the likes of Swift, Williams, and Achane if they remain in great roles with productive schemes and surrounding talents, but knowing what drives their games helps you have a better grasp of when to part company from their services.

7. Betting Against Lamar Jackson Should Be Growing Tiresome

There's a lot to admire about Lamar Jackson's journey from high school star to NFL quarterback. He has overcome unfair perceptions about him at every turn, often exceeding expectations.

Despite having a great pocket presence, scouts mostly saw him as a good runner and a flawed passer. Their superficial methods of charting labeled Jackson as inaccurate despite a clear-cut wealth of dropped passes that should be contextualized with any quarterback evaluation process.

Talking heads and former GMs didn't believe Jackson had the capabilities to play quarterback on Sundays despite multiple strong years in Bobby Petrino's pro-style offense. The phrase Petrino's pro-style offense was the football equivalent of a platinum standard certification, but somehow, this didn't count for Jackson, who spent every morning before class at the football facility with VR goggles reviewing game film from the quarterback's point of view where he could practice reading and reacting to coverages and blitzes.

Despite exceeding expectations, everyone thought Jackson was a naive bumpkin for having his mother represent him during his pre-draft process. They made it a foregone conclusion that Jackson would cheat himself out of millions as his representation during this offseason's round of contract negotiations. Instead, agents praised his efforts in an area that most quarterbacks wouldn't have dared undertake — quarterbacks whose intelligence, skills, and leadership weren't questioned at every turn.

This is the side of racial bias with which most are familiar. Those who believe themselves allies often criticize individuals and groups that demonstrate these biases. At the same time, many of these allies can be guilty of a savior complex — believing that they know what's best for those subjected to these biases, and to help the aggrieved, they impose limits that make matters worse.

This savior complex is often rooted in the belief that the people they are helping are indeed inferior in some way, and their approach is arrogant, controlling, and ignorant. I can't make a definitive statement that former Ravens' offensive coordinator Greg Roman had a savior complex toward Lamar Jackson.

I can quote what Baltimore Head Coach John Harbaugh told Kurt Warner this week when Warner interviewed the staff leading up to their NFL Network broadcast of the Ravens-Titans game:

Harbaugh told Warner that he changed from Roman to Todd Monken because "We weren't evolving offensively, and we wanted to tap into all what Lamar Jackson could be."

Roman could have easily been inflexible with changes to his scheme. We've seen this before with quarterbacks where racial bias isn't a potential part of the equation.

At the same time, when combining the pre-draft assumptions and mischaracterizations about Jackson with a Roman offense that didn't allow Jackson to change plays at the line of scrimmage, it's easy to wonder if there was a time that the Ravens feared that Jackson lacked the capabilities to function like most first-round quarterbacks.

I can't tell you this is the case, but there is enough smoke to consider that explanation possible. Certainly, there was plenty of savior-like behavior regarding his contract negotiation, as well as from analysts and scouts over the years who've believed that Jackson was a great talent but a limited quarterback who required an offense that might not work out long-term.

Tom Brady, Drew Brees, and Joe Montana had limited arm talent similar to Jackson, but no one characterized their systems for minimizing their physical weaknesses as flawed. All of those systems emphasized Brady, Brees, and Montana's conceptual talent for the game. Baltimore minimized it while maximizing Jackson's physical prowess.

There may be a lot more nuance to how I characterized things, but until we learn otherwise, it sounds to me that Jackson and Harbaugh eventually arrived at the same conclusions and realized it was time for the Ravens' starter to have the opportunity to prove he could be a full-fledged veteran quarterback.

So far, the returns are strong. The receiving corps may not be setting the fantasy world abuzz, but Jackson is QB4 after six weeks, completing nearly 70 percent of his passes. Here's Jackson's production through Week 6 this year versus his previous career year in 2019.

• 2023: 173 attempts, 121 completions, 69.9%, 1253 passing yards, 5 TDs, 3 INTs, 60 attempts, 327 rushing yards, 4 rushing TDs
• 2019: 195 attempts, 127 completions, 65.1%, 1507 passing yards, 11 TDs, 5 INTs, 69 attempts, 460 rushing yards, 2 rushing TDs

Although Jackson had more yardage and passing touchdowns in 2019 after six weeks, he's more efficient this year and doing it without his true lead back. He's also the No.4 fantasy QB against defenses that are playing a lot more Cover 2 to limit the vertical passing game in contrast to 2019, where spread offenses were bombing NFL defenses to distraction.

Fantasy GMs may not see the differences for receivers in the box score, and Jackson's 2023 fantasy totals are 30 points less than his 2019 tally thus far, but the on-field results are compelling. Jackson is identifying opportunities to get out of bad plays and into calls that yield chunk gains.

These adjustments often take time to occur. Monken still characterizes the personnel's familiarity with his scheme as a work in progress. Even so, Jackson is proving he is an adept football mind. Once his teammates get on the same page, we may see a whole other gear of football many haven't anticipated.

8. Lessons from Quentin Johnston's Rookie Year

Although many didn't pay close enough attention to Johnston's game at TCU, it was clear from the film that Johnston had issues with his tracking and attack of the ball. These are deep-rooted issues, and you can tell because even when he was executing the correct techniques, he didn't appear fluid or comfortable doing so.

This does not bode well for Johnston's path to becoming a primary NFL receiver. I don't know of any receiver who has had this issue upon arrival to the NFL and became a top option for his team. Jake Reed might be the closest as the No.2 to Cris Carter during a four-year span where he averaged 74 catches, 1,200 yards, and 6.5 scores between 1994 and 1997.

Reed sought the help of experts to refine his hand-eye coordination, and Reed enjoyed a 12-year NFL career with that excellent 4-year peak.

There may be others like Reed, but I'm unfamiliar with them beyond Quincy Enunwa, the former Jets receiver whose attack and positioning were raw. He spent dedicated time daily at a JUGS machine for over a year, correcting and refining his technique. Just as his work was paying off on the field, a neck injury derailed his career.

What is becoming more well-known among fans and media is that players don't get "coached up" on position fundamentals.

Most players need additional work, if not complete development, with specific techniques or concepts related to their position when they enter the league. The best example I often reference is Tony Gonzalez, who explained to Cris Collinsworth and Bill Belichick (2-minute mark) that, after leading his team in drops in his second season, he developed a plan to address his flaws and enlisted the aid of coaches and team staff to drill him before and after practices.

Gonzalez did this work daily for years. He came up with the program, not his coaches. He initiated the drilling.

A lot of players won't do this on their own, or if they do, they may not work as intelligently as Gonzalez. Nowadays, players often hire private coaches for this work, but it's no guarantee that a player will A) hire a coach who will give an honest and/or detailed assessment on what will help their game the most and B) listen to that coach and work at the flaws that ail their game.

Many players want to get quicker, faster, and more physically coordinated with their footwork. Attacking the ball and body positioning after years of doing it incorrectly may require the player to strip their game down to the studs and rebuild.

This won't happen during the season, and it's common that if a player corrects a troublesome problem during the offseason, they still default to "on-stage behavior" during their actual performances before they've put in enough hours to ingrain the new techniques.

Perhaps Johnston bucks the trend and reworks his game. Or, Johnston's tracking issues aren't that serious, and his problem is more about making a concerted effort to use the correct techniques for positioning and attack that he has shown that he can perform but has to become more confident with using them.

We'll hope that Johnston stops defaulting to poor attack techniques with routes that break inside, outside, or back to the quarterback. If his technique is consistently better in these areas, it will be a good sign that he can become at least a consistent fantasy WR3 in an offense that realizes he's not a strong vertical threat.

If Johnston can make a concerted effort to attack vertical targets with a better set of techniques that eliminates clap attacks, he could emerge as a fantasy WR2 because he can earn deep separation and run under the ball.

If Johnston figures out when to execute the jump-through technique that good boundary/vertical receivers can execute at a high level, he could reach his fullest potential as a receiver. You're familiar with the jump-through technique, even if you didn't know it was an actual technique with a name.

Here's an example of Jaxon Smith-Njigba performing this technique.

This is what Quentin Johnston must learn to do — a proper jump-through with overhand attack.

Jaxon Smith-Njigba pic.twitter.com/eCXOqtCVHc

— Matt Waldman (@MattWaldman) November 20, 2023

Players who don't use the optimal attack but have few drops during their college career and appear comfortable making a variety of plays with their methods still have a chance for sustained success in the NFL. Marvin Harrison (daddy, not junior), Terry McLaurin, and Golden Tate are examples. There aren't many who do, but they exist.

Players who don't track the ball effectively and appear indecisive, tentative, and uncomfortable catching certain targets have more concerning futures.

9. Players Can Improve: Rachaad White and Travis Etienne Jr.

Both options entered the league with big-play mentalities that often led to them skimping on attacking small creases with the ferocity to maximize gains on less promising opportunities. This year, both White and Etienne have learned that the best running backs mitigate worst-case outcomes with effective game management.

They think more about down and distance, field position, time left on the clock, and the scoreboard before considering a bounce or a cutback that could cost their team a loss and limit the playbook. Now, they are taking the gains of 1-3 yards that keep the breadth of the playbook open.

Although some players don't want to improve, don't know how to work smart enough to improve, or haven't figured out that they have areas requiring improvement, White and Etienne have shown they have matured. Even if their yards-per-carry efficiencies aren't appealing, their improved decision-making is the reason their teams have entrusted them with volume that drives their top-five performances at their position.

10. Christian McCaffrey Is Great...Nick Chubb Was Great

McCaffrey is one of the great all-purpose backs in the game. Chubb was arguably the league's best runner. Despite possessing different body types and athletic styles, McCaffrey and Chubb share things that many great backs have in common:

• The ability to gauge the pace of opponents.
• The ability to control their pacing.
• Excellent footwork.
• Optimal hip mobility to support efficient but dynamic footwork.
• The ability to create rushing lanes without direct help from blocks.

McCaffrey has his career-best for touchdowns in a season and could reach that milestone for rushing yardage. Kyle Shanahan would be correct to choose Brock Purdy as the team's most valuable player because of the value of the quarterback position to an offense. Purdy is the difference between this team making and missing the playoffs.

McCaffrey is the team's most talented player. He's the difference between the 49ers being good and great.

Chubb was this type of player and the driver of the Browns' offense. For a big man who ran through every level of the defense, Chubb moved a lot like a small back in subtle ways most didn't notice.

Rehabbing a second multi-ligament tear in the same knee, including a partial ACL tear, odds are against Chubb returning to his past greatness.

After evaluating Chubb at Georgia and describing his knee injury as a sophomore against Tennessee to Jene Bramel, our original resident doc at this site explained how unusual it is for a football player to have success with surgery on three ligaments in the same knee.

Bramel explained that the surgeon has to tie these ligaments at the perfect amount of tension. Too much makes the knee feel tight, and too little makes the knee feel too loose. Chubb's had to be just right, and it's a big if whether he'll have that good fortune again.

2023 had some fantastic moments from emerging and established players. Still, Chubb's injury was one of the most impactful and could be the beginning of the end for his run as an elite performer. While rooting against that outcome, it's worthwhile having a realistic outlook.

It's also worth remembering what Chubb did as well or better than most backs in the history of the game. We'll wish the best of luck to Chubb for another miraculous rehab. And good luck to those of you who still have a meaningful game next week.